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is to do everything possible to assure the defendant the constitutional
rights that are guaranteed at the trial stage, it is equally important that if
they are not granted there that they continually and consistently be
pursued at every level. Though from the decision in Turnerit appears that
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals may be unsympathetic to such
appeals, it is hoped that the full court will rehear this case and reverse this
murderer to torture or commit an aggravated battery before killing a
victim; "torture" and "aggravated battery" required a showing of "physi-
cal abuse"); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (a crime is commit-
ted in an especially "cruel" manner when the perpetrator inflicts mental
anguish or physical abuse before the victim's death. A murder is
committed in an especially "depraved" manner when the perpetrator
either relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion, or
shows indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a sense
of pleasure in the killing); Huffstetler v. Dixon, 28 F.3d 1209 (4th Cir.
1994):
Was the murder especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel? As to
the circumstance, the burden is upon the State to prove to you
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the murder
in this case was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. A
person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost
every murder as especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Not
every murder is especially so. Before you may find the
existence of this circumstance, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the brutality involved in the murder in
this case exceeds that normally present in any killing. The
panel decision or that this issue will eventually be resolved by the United
States Supreme Court. It is thus crucial to preserve this issue until that
day comes.
62
Summary and analysis by:
Timothy B. Heavner
words "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" mean ex-
tremely or particularly or especially heinous or atrocious or
cruel. Heinous means hateful, odious, and reprehensible, and
it also means extremely wicked or shockingly evil. Atrocious
means marked by or given to extreme wickedness, brutal or
cruel, marked by extreme violence or savagely fierce, outra-
geously wicked or violent. Cruel means designed to inflict a
high degree of pain, utterly indifferent to or enjoyment of the
suffering of others. For you to find this murder to have been
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, it must have been done
without conscience, pitiless, and so as to be unusually tortious
to [the victim]. That is, in the nature of torture or serious
physical abuse of [the victim] before death.
62 For a fuller discussion of the basis for these arguments in
litigating the "vileness" factor in Virginia, see Lago, supra note 53. For
more complete documentation for each of the steps in litigating the
Virginia limiting constructions, seeDefending a Capital Murder Case in
Virginia, a manual published by the Virginia Capital Case Clearing-
house.
BREARD v. COMMONWEALTH
248 Va. 68, 445 S.E.2d 670 (1994)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Ruth Dickie was murdered on February 17, 1992, in her Arling-
ton apartment. Police also found evidence of attempted rape.1 Six
months laterpolice arrested Angel Breard for sexually assaulting Jeanine
Price, also of Arlington. Because of the assaults' similarities, Breard
became a suspect in Dickie's unsolved murder.2 Later Breard was
indicted for attempted rape and capital murder in the commission of rape
or attempted rape.
3
The jury found Breard guilty of capital murder and attempted
rape.4 The jury subsequently sentenced Breard to death on the capital
murder conviction, finding both "vileness" and "future dangerousness."
Breard appealed the attempted rape conviction to the Virginia Court of
1 Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 72-73, 445 S.E.2d 670,
673-74 (1994).
2 Id. at 85, 445 S.E.2d at 680.
Appeals and the capital murder conviction to the Supreme Court of
Virginia. The Court of Appeals affirmed the attempted rape conviction,
and Breard appealed it to the Supreme Court of Virginia as well. Thai
court consolidated both of the appeals with its automatic review ol
Breard's death sentence.5
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia found no reversible error in the trial
court's judgments and thus affirmed Breard's capital murder convictior
3 Id. at 71,445 S.E.2d at 673.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 72, 445 S.E.2d at 673.
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and death sentence. 6 The court also held, inter alia,7 that Breard's
sentence was not imposed under "passion, prejudice or any other arbi-
trary factor,"8 and that the death sentence here was not "excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the crime and the defendant." 9
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Procedural Defaults
Unfortunately Angel Breard must be added to the long list of
Virginia capital defendants who lose issues in appellate courts due to
strictly applied procedural default rules.10 Because Breard either erred
procedurally while raising issues, or entirely failed to raise issues at trial,
the Supreme Court of Virginia refused to address these issues. 11
Some of these issues involved jury selection. Breard moved to
strike juror Jane Healey for cause during voir dire. The trial judge
temporarily denied the motion until voir dire ended, but Breard never
renewed the motion. 12 The Supreme Court of Virginia ignored the issue
accordingly. 13 Another juror, Bonnie Courtney, stated at one point
during the proceedings that she had read a newspaper article about the
trial. Breard did not move for a mistrial upon this revelation, but raised
the issue on appeal. 14 Again, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
Breard's failure to move for a mistrial rendered this claim untimely. 15
Also at trial, the victim's mother testified as to her daughter's age
and marital status at the time of her death; that the victim had been her
6 Id. at 89, 445 S.E.2d at 682.
7 Breard's defense counsel diligently preserved several issues for
appeal from trial, and raised other issues on direct appeal. The court
summarily disposed of many of these issues in one or two sentences.
This summary does not address most of these issues, many of which are
too fact-specific to make review useful. They include: (1) trial court's
refusal to hold a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the constitutionality of
death by electrocution; (2) constitutionality of Virginia's death penalty,
since the jury is not required to find that mitigating factors outweigh
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) constitutionality of
Virginia's aggravating factors of "vileness" and "future dangerous-
ness," since they are vague and unreliable; (4) rejection of the claim that
the death penalty is arbitrary, discriminatory, excessive, contrary to
society's "evolving standards of decency," and constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment; (5) trial court's refusal to grant Breard additional
peremptory challenges; (6) trial court's refusal to hold "individual and
sequestered voir dire"; (7) rejection of the claim that Virginia death
penalty defendants are denied "meaningful appellate review"; (8) con-
stitutionality of the trial court's ability to consider hearsay information
in a presentence report pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.5 (Supp.
1993); (9) rejection of the claim that the trial court's imposition of the
death penalty is conducted arbitrarily and discriminatorily, and is
therefore unconstitutional; (10) trial court's exclusion of Elna Broffnan
from the jury when she stated that she "could not consider the death
penalty"; (11) trial court's refusal to exclude certain other jurors for
cause, based on certain of their statements; (12) trial court's admission
of certain photographs and diagrams of the victim and the crime scene,
since many of these items were repetitive and served only to incite the
jury's passions; (13) trial court's iefusal of Breard's instruction that he
"could not be found guilty of capitalmurder if his voluntary intoxication
rendered him incapable of deliberating or premeditating"; (14) trial
court's refusal to omit language which added nothing to the definition of
insanity from a jury instruction; and (15) sufficiency of the evidence to
only child; and that she wore glasses. The mother cried as she left the
witness stand. After a lunch recess, Breard moved for a mistrial on the
grounds that the mother's testimony had no probative value and only
served to inflame thejury's passions. The trial court denied the motion. 
16
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that Breard's counsel
had not moved for a mistrial on this issue until after four other witnesses
had testified and the trial had recessed for lunch. The court classified the
motion as untimely and refused to address it.17 The court also refused to
address another motion for mistrial because Breard made the motion
(alleging that the Commonwealth's closing argument at the guilt phase
was improper) after the jury had retired.
18
The court also barred Breard's objections to the trial court's refusal
of certain of Breard's proposed jury instructions. The court decided that
Breard's failure to object to the refusal at trial barred his claims as to jury
instructions defining "irresistible impulse" and "willful, deliberate and
premeditated," respectively. 19 Finally, the court refused to hear Breard's
contention that the Commonwealth made an improper closing argument
during the penalty phase as well, since "Breard requested neither a
cautionary instruction nor a mistrial." 20
These examples reinforce the vital importance of timely objections
and preserving issues for the record. 2t From the court's holdings here,
it is evident that counsel for capital defendants can avoid procedural
default in three ways. First, objections should be made at the proper
times. If there is any doubt about whether an objection is continuing, it
should be renewed.22 Second, all errors should be assigned on appeal,
both on direct appeal and in state and federal habeas corpus proceedings.
show that: (a) the murder was "willful, deliberate, and premeditated,"
and (b) that Breard raped the victim.
8 Breard, 248 Va. at 88, 445 S.E.2d at 681-82.
9 Id. at 89, 445 S.E.2d at 682.
10 See, e.g.,Pruett v. Thompson, 996 F.2d 1560 (4th Cir. 1993), and
case summary of Pruett, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 15
(1993). See also Groot, To Attain the Ends of Justice: Confronting
Virginia's Default Rules in Capital Cases, Capital Defense Digest, Vol.
6, No. 2, p. 44 (1994).
11 See infra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
12 Breard, 248 Va. at 80, 445 S.E.2d at 677.
13 Id. at 80, 445 S.E.2d 677-78.




18 Id. at 82, 445 S.E.2d at 679.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 87,445 S.E.2d at 681 n.2.
2 1 See, e.g.,Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268,427 S.E.2d411
(1993) (illustrating the application of procedural default rules to several
jury issues, including voir dire), and case summary of Beavers, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 26 (1993); Quesinberry v. Common-
wealth, 241 Va. 364,402 S.E.2d 218 (1991) (illustrating the application
of procedural default rules to jury instructions and other issues), and case
summary of Quesinberry, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 23
(1991).
22 See, e.g. Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 427 S.E.2d
411 (1993), and case summary of Beavers, Capital Defense Digest, Vol.
6, No. 1, p. 26. (1993), specifically the directives concerning objections
at voir dire at p. 27. See also Groot, To Attain the Ends of Justice:
Confronting Virginia's Default Rules in Capital Cases, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 44 (1994).
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Finally, all errors should be briefed at all these stages as well. Admittedly
preserving every issue is immensely difficult. But procedural default
rules are applied so strictly in Virginia that in spite of counsel's diligent
efforts, capital defendants can easily lose a series of issues from trial to
appeal.
23
II. Bill of Particulars
Prior to trial, Breard moved for a bill of particulars, apparently
requesting the Commonwealth to provide the definitions of "vileness"
and "future dangerousness" which it would use at trial.24 The trial court
denied Breard's request.25 The Supreme Court of Virginia flatly rejected
Breard's claim that the trial court erred, stating that "a bill of particulars
is not required if the indictment gives an accused notice of the nature and
character of the offense charged. In the present case, the indictment gave
Breard such notice."
'26
United States Supreme Court precedent virtually requires that a bill
of particulars must include aggravating factors, and their definitions,
intended by the state to be proven in support of a death sentence. The
indictment provides a defendant no notice on this matter. 27 Despite the
unwillingness of the Supreme Court of Virginia to reexamine this issue,
capital defense attorneys in Virginia should continue to raise it. This
decision shows that counsel should continue to insist on this bill of
particulars on federal grounds.2 8 Counsel should also preserve the issue
through every appeal to reach the federal court system, where at some
point the error may be corrected.
M. Standard of Proof for Unadjudicated Acts at Sentencing
The Commonwealth must prove a capital defendant's future dan-
gerousness "beyond a reasonable doubt."29 The Commonwealth at-
tempted to demonstrate Breard's future dangerousness by way of testi-
mony concerning Breard's alleged assault on Jeanine Price and alleged
assault on another woman before Ruth Dickie's murder. 30 Breard
wanted to instruct the jury that if the Commonwealth tried to show
Breard's "future dangerousness" via any of these unadjudicated acts, it
had to prove that he committed such acts (i.e., "building block evidence")
beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court refused this instruction.
31
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the trial court's refusal.
32
No authority exists for the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for
such "building block evidence." However, although the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard may not be constitutionally required, some
standard should indeed be required. It can be argued that the Common-
23 See Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:19-5:35.
24 Breard, 248 Va. at 76,445 S.E.2d at 675. The record does not
state what Breard requested in the bill of particulars.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 For cases holding that a defendant must have an opportunity to
rebut the state's case for death-which obviously requires knowing what
the aggravating factors to be relied upon are, and, where the law requires,
their definitions-see Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187
(1994), and case summary of Simmons, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue; Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110(1991); Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349 (1977).
28 Id.
29 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264A(C) (1990).
30 Breard, 248 Va. at 85, 445 S.E.2d at 680.
wealth should have to show that a defendant committed certain
unadjudicated acts at least by a "preponderance of the evidence." This
argument stems from several United States Supreme Court opinions as
well as Virginia law. Some of the federal decisions equate the sentencing
phase of capital trials with the guilt phase for certain purposes. The other
decisions, state and federal, establish the "preponderance of the evi-
dence" standard for "building block evidence" in contexts analogous to
capital penalty trials.
In Bullington v. Missouri33 the Court held that in capital cases, the
penalty phase of the trial should be treated the same way as the guilt phase
of the trial for purposes of a defendant's Fifth Amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy. In Strickland v. Washington34 the Court
extended that argument for the purposes of a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel. Thus, proving elements of "future dangerousness"
at sentencing beyond a reasonable doubt can be equated to proving
elements of an offense at trial beyond a reasonable doubt, especially
given the structure of the Virginia capital sentencing statute.
In some instances "preponderance of the evidence" is used to
establish preliminary factual questions at the guilt phase, though the final
act must be proven "beyond a reasonable doubt." An example at the state
level is modus operandi evidence. In Chichester i. Commonwealth,
35
the defendant had been convicted of capital murder and robbery. Evi-
dence linking the defendant to a previous robbery had been admitted on
the basis of similar modus operandi evidence. 36 In Chichester, the
Supreme Court of Virginia stated that "[ilf the evidence of other crimes
bears sufficient marks of similarity to the crime charged to establish that
the defendant is probably the common perpetrator, that evidence is
relevant and admissible if its probative value outweighs it prejudicial
effect."'37 This criteria indicates a preponderance of the evidence
admissibility standard for modus operandi evidence, though the Com-
monwealth would still have to prove the actual crime "beyond a reason-
able doubt."
At the federal level, another example is conspiracy. In Bourjaily v.
United States,3 8 the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute
cocaine. The District Court had ruled that a co-conspirator's statements
were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2)(E), since the
government had shown proof of a conspiracy between the defendant and
his co-conspiratorby apreponderance of the evidence. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed.39 The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding
that "when the preliminary facts relevant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are
disputed, the offering party must prove them by a preponderance of the
evidence."40 Thus, though the government would still have to prove the
31 Id. at 86, 445 S.E.2d at 681.
32 Id.
33 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
34 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
35 448 S.E.2d638 (1994). See case summary of Chichester, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
36 The Supreme Court of Virginia had earlier held modus operand
evidence admissible where identity is a disputed issue. See Spencer 1'
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 89-90, 393 S.E.2d 609, 616, cert. denied
498 U.S. 908 (1990).
37 Chichester, 448 S.E.2d at 649 (emphasis added).
38 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
39 Bourjaily v. United States, 781 F.2d 539 (6th Cir. 1986).
40 Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 176.
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conspiracy itself beyond a reasonable doubt, evidence tending to prove
conspiracy could be admitted under a preponderance standard.
Applying this logic to capital cases, the Commonwealth must prove
future dangerousness itself beyond a reasonable doubt.41 Though the
Commonwealth would have a less burdensome standard for evidence
tending to prove "future dangerousness" (i.e., unadjudicated acts), it
would still need to show that the defendant committed the unadjudicated
acts by apreponderance of the evidence. Some standard is better than no
standard for capital defendants. The Supreme Court of Virginia has
rejected the claim that a beyond a reasonable doubt standard is required
and there is no legal authority to compel use of that standard. Thus, where
alleged unadjudicated acts are contested, the better practice would be for
capital defense attorneys to ask for a "preponderance of the evidence"
standard injury instructions. Absent any standard, capital juries are free
to find that defendants committed violent acts relevant to the "future
dangerousness" factor on the basis of completely unreliable evidence.
IV. Commonwealth Use of Defense Experts
The trial court in Breard had granted Breard's motion for appoint-
ment of mental health experts under Virginia Code section 19.2-
264.3:1(A). Defense counsel elected not to use these experts at trial.42
Apparently, however, the trial court also appointed these same experts to
examine Breard concerning sanity at the time of the offense as per
Virginia Code section 19.2-169.5(A). Section 19.2-264.3:1(B) ex-
pressly authorizes the court to use the same expert appointed to evaluate
and assist in developing mitigation to evaluate sanity. 43 The court's
appointment actions were thus authorized by statute.
The Commonwealth called the experts to testify at trial, even
though Breard's defense counsel had elected not to call them as wit-
nesses. The trial court overruled Breard's objection. The Supreme Court
of Virginia affirmed, finding that their testimony that they had evaluated
Breard at the request of defense counsel was relevant "because it
provided background information about the experts and showed how
they became involved in the case."44 It is unclear exactly how this issue
was presented to the Virginia Supreme Court, but if it was framed
properly, it is almost inconceivable that this error could have been
allowed to stand.
First, Sections 19.2-264.3:1 and 19.2-169.5 both classify experts
appointed under those statutes as defense experts.45 Thus Breard should
still have been afforded the same protection guaranteed by both statutes,
41 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) (1990).
42 Breard, 248 Va. at 82, 445 S.E.2d at 678-79.
43 Section 19.2-264.3:1 was drafted in response to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985),
where the Court held that when an indigent defendant's sanity is a
significant factor at both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, due
process requires that the court provide expert psychiatric assistance to
the defendant. See also Chichester v. Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 638
(1994), and case summary of Chichester, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue.
44 Breard, 248 Va. at 82, 445 S.E.2d at 678-79.
45 Section 19.2-264.3:1(A) (emphasis added) reads: "the court
shall appoint one or more qualified mental health experts to evaluate the
defendant and to assist the defense in the preparation and presentation
even though the experts appointed under each statute were the same
persons. Breard declined to use these experts at trial. Consequently, the
Commonwealth should not have been allowed to call them to testify at all.
Second, when the Commonwealth called the experts, it referred to
Breard's having selected them. Breard argued that the trial court erred
in failing to declare a mistrial. The Supreme Court of Virginia found that
the motion had been made after the jury retired, and was thus too late.
46
The court itself stated that "[a]ll three [experts] had been selected by
Breard's counsel." 47 But Sections 19.2-264.3:1 and 19.2-169.5 are
discretionary statutes, meaning that the court may or may not appoint the
experts suggested by the defense to conduct either examination.48 Thus,
at most, Breard could only have recommended that the court appoint
those experts. The Commonwealth should not have been able to state that
Breard had selected the experts.
The Supreme Court of Virginia's brief comment in rejecting the
claim did not discuss the issues of privilege, work product, or use of the
client's statements.
The court's ruling should not deter defense counsel from using
expert assistance made available by statutes. Subpoenas or attempts to
call defense experts as witnesses can be resisted. Issues that were
apparently unseen or unlitigated by the Supreme Court of Virginia in
Breard can be addressed and the record made in motions to quash
subpoenas or in hearings on the objection.
V. Jury Instructions at the Penalty Phase
A. "Same Factors Used to Convict" Instruction
The court also upheld the trial court's refusal of Breard's requested
jury instructions concerning the factors considered in determining a
death sentence. Breard wanted to instruct the jury at the penalty phase
that the jury could not sentence him to death "solely on the same factors
used to convict" him of capital murder.49 The trial court refused the
instruction and the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Breard's assign-
ment of error, stating that "[a] finding of 'future dangerousness' and a
consequent death sentence may be based solely upon 'the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense."' 50
It is suggested, however, that defense attorneys can frame a jury
instruction stating that the jury cannot base its imposition of the death
penalty solely on the finding of the legal elements of capital murder. This
was probably the instruction Breard intended, and it is correct. A finding
of information concerning the defendant's history, character, or mental
condition....". Section 19.2-169.5(A) (emphasis added) similarly reads:
"the court shall appoint one or more qualified mental health experts to
evaluate the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense and, where
appropriate, to assist in the development of an insanity defense."
46 Breard, 248 Va. at 82, 445 S.E.2d at 679.
47 Id. at 82, 445 S.E.2d at 678.
48 Section 19.2-264.3:1(A) reads: "The defendant shall not be
entitled to a mental health expert of the defendant's own choosing or to
funds to employ such expert." Section 19.2-169.5(A) uses identical
language.
49 Id. at 86, 445 S.E.2d at 681.
-50 Id. (citing Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) (1990)).
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of the elements of capital murder cannot be used as the sole basis for a
death sentence. The jury must, in addition, find the aggravating factors
of either "vileness" or "future dangerousness."5 1 The trial court (and the
Supreme Court of Virginia) evidently understood Breard's proposed
instruction to mean that Breard wanted to keep the jury from considering
anything which may have contributed to the jury's finding the defendant
guilty during the guilt phase.
B. Defendant's Possibility of Parole Instruction
At trial, defense counsel expressly agreed, apparently for strategic
reasons, to the judge's refusal to answer the jury's question concerning
Breard's parole eligibility.52 The record does not reflect whether Breard
would have been statutorily eligible for parole if sentenced to life in
51 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264A(C) (1990).
52 Breard, 248 Va. at 87, 445 S.E.2d at 681.
53 See Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(4)(C) (Supp. 1994) ("Any person
sentenced to life imprisonment for the first time shall be eligible for
parole after serving fifteen years, except that if such sentence was for a
Class 1 felony violation ... he shall be eligible for parole after serving
twenty-five years, unless he is ineligible for parole pursuant to subsec-
tion BI or B2."); and Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-15 1(4)(D) (Supp. 1994) ("A
person who has been sentenced to two or more life sentences, except a
person to whom the provisions of subsection B 1, B2 or E of this section
are applicable, shall be eligible for parole after serving twenty years of
imprisonment, except that if either such sentence, or both, was or were
for a Class 1 felony violation, and he is not otherwise ineligible forparole
pursuant to subsection B1, B2 or E of this section, he shall be eligible for
parole only after serving thirty years.").
prison. If life in prison for Breard meant life without parole, there is no
justification for such a decision. If a life sentence would technically
mean parole eligibility in twenty-five or thirty years,5 3 however, an
attorney might conclude in the rare case that parole law information
would not be helpful.
The United States Supreme Court recently decided in Simmons v.
South Carolina54 that defense counsel can insist that the jury be informed
when life means life without parole.55 The Court also left open the
possibility that parole information must be given to the jury on request
in any case where future dangerousness is one of the aggravating factors
upon which the Commonwealthrelies in seeking a death sentence.56 The
implication of Simmons in Virginia should be followed closely.
57
Summary and analysis by:
Gregory J. Weinig
54 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
55 See case summary of Simmons, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue.
56 See Pohl & Turner, If atFirst YouDon'tSucceed: The Real and
Potential Impact of Simmons v. South Carolina in Virginia, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
57 Id. At this writing the United States Supreme Court had denied
Breard's petition for certiorari. Breard v. Virginia, 1994 WL 512727
(U.S. 1994). In comparison, the petition of Walter Mickens, Mickens v.
Commonwealth, 247 Va. 395,442 S.E.2d 678 (1994), was granted and
the case remanded to the Supreme Court of Virginia on the Simmons
issue. See Mickens v. Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 307 (1994), and case summary
of Mickens, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
MICKENS v. COMMONWEALTH
247 Va. 395, 442 S.E.2d 678 (1994)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On March 30, 1992, at approximately 12:30 p.m., a body identified
as Timothy Jason Hall was found beneath an abandoned construction
building in Newport News, Virginia. The body, lying face down on a
mattress, was nude from the waist down except for white athletic socks.
Bloody "transfer" stains and a white liquid substance were evident at the
scene. At a nearby river the police found the victim's blue jeans and
underwear which had washed up in the surf of the river. The medical
examiner concluded that the victim had bled to death from twenty-five
of 143 stab wounds.1
On April 4, 1992, Walter Mickens, Jr. was arrested by police on
charges involving Timothy Hall. The following morning warrants were
obtained charging Mickens with Hall's murder and attempted sodomy.
An examination of a stain found on the mattress cover revealed human
sperm. The Commonwealth's DNA analysis taken from the stain also
revealed a pattern similar to Mickens' DNA. Furthermore, Tyrone




Brister testified that when he and Mickens shared a holding cell at the
courthouse on March 26, 1993, Mickens told him he had stabbed
somebody 140 times, sodomized him and stole his sneakers.
2
In the first stage of abifurcated trial, the jury convicted Mickens of
capital murder and attempted forcible sodomy. In the second stage of the
trial, the jury fixed his punishment at death.
3
HOLDING
Consolidating the automatic review of Mickens's death sentence
with his appeal of the capital murder conviction, the Supreme Court ol
Virginia upheld the death sentence based on the "vileness" and "future
dangerousness" predicates. 4
4 The court rejected some of the defendant's assignments of error
in brief, conclusive language. Others did not involve death penalty law.
On still others, the rulings provide little if any guidance because they
apply broad, settled principles of law to facts that are specific to the case
